Marriage Annulment - The Need for Legislation by Rowan, Beverly A.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
10-1-1969
Marriage Annulment - The Need for Legislation
Beverly A. Rowan
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Beverly A. Rowan, Marriage Annulment - The Need for Legislation, 24 U. Miami L. Rev. 112 (1969)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol24/iss1/7
MARRIAGE ANNULMENT-THE NEED FOR
LEGISLATION
BEVERLY A. ROWAN*
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 112
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ACTION .......................................... 114
III. THE FLORIDA POSITION .................................................. 114
IV. THE VOID-VOIDABLE DISTINCTION .......................................... 116
V . GROUNDS ................................................................ 118
A . Incest ............................................................... 118
B . Bigam y ............................................................. 119
C . Im potency .......................................................... 120
D. M ental Incompetency ................................................ 121
E. Intoxication or Influence of Drugs .................................... 122
F. Jest or D are ........................................................ 122
G. Incapacity Due to Non-Age .......................................... 123
H . Fraud ...... ......................................................... 124
I. D uress .............................................................. 126
V I. D EFENSES ............................................................... 127
VII. JURISDICTION ............................................................ 129
VIII. SERVICE OF PROCESS ...................................................... 130
IX. CONSEQUENCES .......................................................... 131
A. Custody, Support and Legitimacy of Children .......................... 131
B . A lim ony ............................................................ 132
C. Property Rights ..................................................... 133
X . CONCLUSION ............................................................. 134
A PROPOSED STATUTE ........................................................... 134
I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of family law there is a very real difference between
divorce and annulment. Divorce is generally granted for causes arising
after the marriage ceremony, and it presupposes the existence of a valid
marriage. Annulment is granted as a result of conditions existing at the
time of the ceremony, and the marriage is void or voidable from the
beginning. Annulment is a hazy, poorly-defined area in the field of mar-
riage law; not only is there much confusion throughout the United States
in the treatment of divorce and annulment, but the distinction between
the two actions has also become increasingly blurred.
The logical and traditional grounds employed in annulment actions
are made grounds for divorce in many states. Nine states provide for
divorce if the marriage is bigamous;' four jurisdictions grant divorce
when the marriage is incestuous; 2 thirty-two states provide for the
* Member of the Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (1962); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522(2) (1953)
FLA. STAT. § 61.041(9) (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 2735 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.010 (1952); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3105.01(A) (Page 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10(b) (1955); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-801(2) (1955).
2. FLA. STAT. § 61.041(1) (1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-102(1) (1952); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 2735 (1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10(h)(2) (1955).
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granting of a divorce for impotency; 3 seven provide that divorce is the
remedy in cases which involve fraudulent marriage contracts.' At least
twelve states permit a husband to obtain a divorce when his wife was
pregnant by another man at the time of the marriage without the hus-
band's knowledge.8 Maryland and Rhode Island permit divorce for any
reason which renders the marriage void ab initio,6 and Washington and
Delaware allow divorce if one of the parties was incapable of consenting
to the marriage for lack of age.7
In most states there is a substantial difference between the number
of divorces and annulments granted." Annulments accounted for only
3 percent of marriage dissolutions in the United States during 1963.'
Probably one of the major reasons why there are relatively few annul-
ments is that generally a woman seeking an annulment thereby relin-
quishes her claim to alimony. Thus, though she might legitimately be
entitled to such a remedy, she is compelled to resort to divorce in order
to be awarded alimony.
Annulment has been used extensively in a few states in order to
3. ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 20 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.110 (1962); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-312(10) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (Supp. 1967); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 46-1-1(b) (1963) ; FLA. STAT. § 61.041(2) (1967) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 30-102(3)
(1952); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1956); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1201(2)
(1968); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.020(1)(a) (1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 691
(1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (1966); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 1 (1958);
MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6(2) (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.06(2) (1969);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 2735 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.010 (1952); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-301(2) (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010(1) (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:
7(I) (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1(3) (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5(2) (1966);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01(D) (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (1961);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.030(1) (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10(1)(a) (1955); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-2 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-801(1) (1955); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-3-1(1) (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(2) (1960); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.08.020(3) (1961); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-38 (1957).
4. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 46-13 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-102(4) (1952);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.020(2)(e) (1962); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (F) (1960);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (1961) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10(g) (1955); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.08.020(1) (1961).
5. ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 21 (1958); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312(8) (1956); GA.
CODE ANN. § 30-102(5) (1952); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.9 (1946); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.-
020(4) (a) (1962); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2735 (1957) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1(4) (1953);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5(3) (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (1961); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-801(9) (1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(7) (1960); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-38
(1957). The Kansas and Oklahoma statutes do not require that the husband be unaware
of the wife's pregnancy by another at the time of the marriage.
6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-1 (1956).
7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522(7)(8) (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.08.020(1)
(1961).
8. For every annulment in the United States there are approximately 137 divorces.
U.S. DEP'T or H.E.W., DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT: DETAILED STATISTICS FOR REPORTING
AREAS 1956, 37, table 2 (Vital Statistics-Special Reports, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1958). In 1968,
there were 31,367 divorces granted in Florida, as opposed to 253 annulments. BUREAU OF
VITAL STATISTICS, FLORIDA STATE BD. OF HEALTH, DIVORCES AND ANNULMENTS BY CAUSE
OF SEPARATION (1959-1968).
9. U.S. DEP'T OF H.E.W., PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DIVORCE STATISTICS ANALYSIS (1963).
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avoid strict divorce laws.' ° For example, in California remarriage by
either party is prohibited for one year following the final decree of
divorce." In New York, until recently, adultery was the only ground for
divorce,' 2 and the guilty party in a divorce action could not remarry
during the lifetime of the other spouse without obtaining permission
from the court.' 8 However, in 1967 five additional grounds for divorce
were provided by statute in that state,'4 and parties to a divorce are now
free to remarry without restriction.' 5 Presumably, the divorce-annulment
ratio in New York will undergo a corresponding shift.
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ACTION
Annulment has a valid place in modern marriage law. The social
stigma attached to divorce may constitute a significant burden to some.
Although there has been a substantial increase in the number of divorces
since the early part of this century,16 nevertheless disapproval of divorce
still exists in large segments of our society. For example, there are religious
objections to divorce; only about 100 Roman Catholic marriages a year
are declared invalid by church courts in the United States, and barely
1000 a year from all over the world are declared invalid. 7 The number
of Catholics affected by the impossibility of divorce in this country
alone has been estimated at between three and five million individuals
among some 46 million members of all ages.' 8 Although a civil annul-
ment does not satisfy Catholic canon law, it may be preferable to some
Catholics because it is theoretically more consistent with the religious
remedy than is divorce.
Also of substantial importance is a consideration of psycholog-
ical pressures. Certain individuals may not be emotionally equipped to
cope with divorce, but can accept the idea of annulment in that it rein-
forces the denial that any meaningful bond ever existed.
III. THE FLORIDA POSITION
Florida has no statutes providing for annulment. There are, there-
fore, no statutory guidelines to follow, and the few reported cases offer
10. California and New York have accounted for almost 73% of all annulments in the
United States. C. FOOrE, R. LEvyr & E. SANDER, CASES ON FA.may LAW 177 (1966).
11. CAL. CIV. CODE § 132 (Deering 1960).
12. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1964).
13. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 8 (McKinney 1964).
14. Cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff, abandonment for 2 or more years,
confinement in prison for 3 or more years, living apart pursuant to a separation for 2
years, and impotency are now grounds for divorce in New York. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW
§ 170 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
15. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 8 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
16. H. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 93, 173 (1959).
17. Pospishil, The Problem of Divorce in the Catholic Church, 7 J. FAMILY L. 595
(1968).
18. Id.
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little aid. Annulment is mentioned in only two places in the Florida
Statutes: in the ninth ground for divorce 9 and in the provision for con-
structive service of process.
20
A few of the traditional grounds for annulment are also grounds for
divorce in Florida.2' It would appear, from the statistics enumerating the
grounds for which divorces and annulments are granted,22 that in this
state an action on the grounds of incest, bigamy, impotency, extreme
cruelty, and desertion could be brought for either divorce or annul-
ment.
23
In addition, the statistics24 list the failure to consummate a marriage
as a separate ground for annulment in Florida. Cruelty and desertion
should be properly limited to actions for divorce, while nonconsumma-
tion of the marriage, discussed below, should be treated not as a separate
and distinct ground but rather as a prerequisite to the annulment action
in certain instances, such as where the marriage was entered into as a
jest or on a dare. Furthermore, the Florida statistics indicate that
habitual intemperance,25 ungovernable temper,26 adultery,27 and the fact
that the defendant was divorced from the plaintiff in another jurisdic-
tion 28 are grounds for divorce exclusively. On the other hand, fraud,
marriage while intoxicated, non-consummation of the marriage, marriage
by an underage party, duress, and insanity are used exclusively in grant-
ing annulments and are not available as grounds for divorce.29
Incest, bigamy, and impotency are made grounds for divorce in
Florida"° in order to enable a wife who innocently entered into the mar-
riage contract to obtain alimony. All three of these grounds should be
grounds for annulment exclusively. Bigamous marriages are absolutely
void, and incest 8 ' and bigamy 2 are both felonies. The problem could be
avoided by providing, in the court's discretion, allowance of alimony to
a deserving wife.
Children born of bigamous marriages are bastardized by statute,83
a situation for which there is no legitimate excuse in this enlightened
19. FLA. STAT. § 61.041(9) (1967).
20. FLA. STAT. § 49.011(4) (1967).
21. Incest, impotency, and bigamy. FLA. STAT. § 61.041(1), (2), (9) (1967).
22. BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS, FLORIDA STATE BD. OF HEALTH, DIVORCES AND ANNUL-
IMENTS BY CAUSE OF SEPARATION (1959-1968) (hereinafter cited as VITAL STATISTICS).
23. Incest, impotency, extreme cruelty, desertion, and bigamy are grounds for divorce
in Florida. FLA. STAT. § 61.041(1), (2), (4), (7), (9) (1967).
24. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
25. FLA. STAT. § 61.041(6) (1967).
26. FLA. STAT. § 61.041(5) (1967).
27. FLA. STAT. § 61.041(3) (1967).
28. FLA. STAT. § 61.041(8) (1967).
29. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
30. FLA. STAT. § 61.041(1), (2), (9) (1967).
31. FLA. STAT. §§ 741.21, 741.22 (1967).
32. FLA. STAT. § 799.01 (1967).
33. FLA. STAT. § 61.051 (1967).
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
age. Statutory provision should be made so that the children of annull-
able marriages are deemed legitimate for all purposes.
The entire area of divorce and annulment in Florida should be
clarified by statute. To employ grounds exclusively for annulments, or to
allow alternative remedies of divorce or annulment without making
statutory provision therefor, is to foster and sustain the confusion ram-
pant in this field of the law.
IV. THE VOID-VOIDABLE DISTINCTION
Traditionally, a void marriage is void from its inception and does
not require a nullifying decree. It may be attacked either during the
marriage or subsequent to the death of one of the parties. A voidable
marriage, on the other hand, is valid until annulled by decree. It must
be attacked during the lifetime of the parties, and it can be ratified.
In the United States, irregularities which are usually deemed to
render a union void are incest 4 and bigamy.8" Marriages burdened by
impotency are declared voidable in seven jurisdictions and void in two. 6
At common law the marriage of an imbecile or lunatic was regarded as
void,87 and statutes of eleven states so provide. 8 In thirteen states the
marriage of a mental defective is labelled voidable. 9 Statutes of eight
jurisdictions declare marriages void for non-age,4" but statutes of fifteen
34. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 326 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-103 (1947);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 89, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1966); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, §§ 1, 2,
8 (1958); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.1 (1967).
35. See, e.g., D.C. CODE A.N. § 30-101 (1961); IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-104 (1965);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 402.020 (1962); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.030 (1952); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-103 (1968).
36. The seven jurisdictions are Arkansas, District of Columbia, Mississippi, New York,
Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-106 (1947); D.C. CODE
ENCYCL. ANN. § 30-103 (1961); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2748-02 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. Dom.
REL. LAW § 7(3) (McKinney 1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 512 (1958); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-45 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-1 (1966).
The two state codes which term such alliances void are N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (1966);
and TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4628 (1960).
37. Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343 (N.Y. 1820); see F. HARPER &. J. SKOL-
NICK, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 77 (1962).
38. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-102, 53-104 (1960); IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-104 (1965);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 402.020 (1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 32, 631 (1964); MICH.
ComP. LAWS ANN. § 552.1 (1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.020 (1949); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-103 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-1-5 (1956);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1953); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-32 (1957).
39. ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.031 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-106 (1947); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 46-3-1 (1963); D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-103 (1961); MIN. STAT. ANN. § 518.02
(1969); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2748-02 (Supp. 1968); NEv. REV. STAT. § 125.330 (1967);
N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 7(2) (McKinney 1964); ORE. RV. STAT. § 106.030 (1967); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 512 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.04.130 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-1 (1966).
40. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-102, 53-104 (1961); Ky. REV. STAT. § 402.020 (1962); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 9 (1958); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 552.2 (1967); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518.01 (1969); N.H. RaV. STAT. AmN. § 457:4 (1968); N.C. GEa. STAT.
§ 51-3 (1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1953).
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states describe such marriages as voidable."' Unions induced by fraud
are designated voidable in thirteen states42 and void in two.48 Those
entered into as a result of duress are considered voidable in eleven juris-
dictions 4" and void in two.
45
In Florida a final decree of divorce or annulment takes effect as of
the time it is entered.46 The annulment of a voidable marriage, therefore,
cannot bastardize a child. If the marriage is void, however, e.g., big-
amous marriages and marriages of mental incompetents, there is dictum to
the effect that the child is illegitimate. 4' Again, this situation should be
remedied by statute.
Also, in Florida the void-voidable distinction plays a significant part
in the relation-back doctrine. The 1966 case of Reese v. Reese49 held
that after dissolution of her void second marriage, a wife was entitled
to have alimony from her first husband reinstated; but Evans v. Evans50
held that the wife was not entitled to reinstatement of alimony from her
first husband where her second marriage was merely voidable. In light
of these cases, whether the first husband will have to resume alimony
payments to his former wife after the annulment of her second marriage
will depend on whether the second marriage is void or voidable. The first
husband who, finding himself free of the obligation to support his first
wife, contracts a second marriage, may then discover that the payments
to his first wife must be resumed. This inequitable result could be
avoided by statutory provision, as has been accomplished in Colorado.5'
The void-voidable classification would seem to have no place in
modern annulment legislation. While the dual classification perhaps is
41. ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.031 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-106 (1947); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 46-3-1 (1963); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 30-103 (1968); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 44-106 (1965); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2748-02 (Supp. 1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-118
(1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.310 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-9 (1953); N.Y. DOm.
REL. LAW § 7(1) (McKinney 1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 106.030 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 512 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.130 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 48-2-1 (1966); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-33 (1957).
42. ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.031 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-106 (1947); D.C. CODE
ENCYCL. ANN. § 30-103 (1968); IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-106 (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.02 (1969); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2748-02 (Supp. 1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-118
(1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.340 (1967); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 7(4) (McKinney
1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 106.030 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 512 (1958); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.04.130 (1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-33 (1957).
43. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-103, 53-104 (1961); McH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.2 (1967).
44. ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.031 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-106 (1947); D.C. CODE
ENcYcL. ANN. § 30-103 (1968); MnN. STAT. ANN. § 518.02 (1969); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 2748-02 (Supp. 1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-118 (1968); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 7(4)
(McKinney 1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 106.030 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 512 (1958);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.130 (1961); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-33 (1957).
45. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-103, 53-104 (1961); McH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.2 (1967).
46. Jones v. Jones, 119 Fla. 824, 161 So. 836 (1935).
47. In re Ruff's Estate, 159 Fla. 777, 32 So.2d 840 (1947).
48. Id. See note 33 supra.
49. 192 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1966).
50. 212 So.2d 107 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
51. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-5(5) (1963).
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justifiable as a convenient means of reference, it carries with it the in-
accurate conception that void marriages are different from those which
are voidable. Such an arbitrary classification, varying as it does from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, does not clarify the basic issue of whether a
marriage is annullable or not. It would be preferable to deal with each
case individually under more comprehensive statutes.
V. GROUNDS
A. Incest
An incestuous marriage is one between persons who are related by
blood or marriage. In addition to being a ground for divorce in Florida, 2
incest is also a felony.53
As a general rule, incestuous marriages are absolutely void even
without a decree. 4 Florida, however, departs from the majority rule, and
holds such marriages to be merely voidable. 5 All states have statutes
dealing with consanguinity,56 and about half the states have extended the
prohibition to include affinity. 7 In some states, including Florida," all
restrictions are based on consanguinity, and first cousins are permitted to
marry.5 1 Other states prohibit first cousins from marrying, and the re-
striction extends to relationships arising from affinity.6° There would
seem to be no excuse for such variations throughout the United States,
and a uniform provision, based on consanguinity, should be adopted.
Since an incestuous marriage constitutes a felony, it would seem
preferable to make incest a ground for annulment exclusively. The inter-
est of the state is to discourage these unions initially and to put an end
to them as quickly as possible in order to prevent the conception of a
52. FLA. STAT. § 61.041(1) (1967).
53. See note 31 supra.
54. See note 34 supra.
55. Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939).
56. "Consanguinity" means relationship by blood and descent from a common ancestor.
57. "Affinity" means relationship established by marriage.
58. FLA. STAT. §§ 741.21, 741.22 (1967).
59. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.080 (1962); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (1956); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 55-103 (1947); CAL. Civ. CODE § 59 (Deering 1960); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-9-4 (1963); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 324-1(a) (Supp. 1965); IDAHO CODE § 32-205
(1963) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 89, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-103 (1965) ;
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-102 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. § 402.010 (1963); M:NN. STAT. ANN.
§ 517.03 (Supp. 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.020 (Supp. 1969); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 48-105 (1961); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-103 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.020 (1967);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-1 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-7 (1962); N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW
§ 5 (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-4 (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-03
(1960); Onio REV. STAT. § 3101.01 (Page 1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 106.020 (1967); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-1-1 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.020 (1961); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 245.03 (Supp. 1969); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-32 (1957).
60. See, e.g., IOWA CODE Asw. § 595.19 (1946); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 31
(1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-705 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1, 2 (1958);
VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-38 (1960).
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child. Either party to the marriage, or the state attorney in the county
in which either party resides, should be allowed to bring the action.
Of 2,240 annulments granted in Florida over the past ten years,
only three have been on the ground of incest.6 '
B. Bigamy
A bigamous marriage is one contracted at a time when either party
to the marriage already has a spouse living and undivorced.62 Bigamy is
a ground for divorce in Florida,"3 and furthermore, is a felony 4 requiring
no scienter. 5
Bigamous marriages are absolutely void. Generally when a marriage
is void, there can be no alimony, dower, or interest in property, as no
rights attach to a void marriage. States which make bigamy a ground
for divorce do so for the express purpose of providing an innocent wife
with the opportunity to obtain alimony.
Some states permit an annulment suit on the ground of bigamy to be
brought by either spouse.66 In Florida only an innocent party can bring
an action for annulment or divorce on this ground.67 Since bigamy is a
crime which may be committed by a person who believes himself free to
marry,6 criminal prosecution in such a case seems unduly harsh. The
state should have the option of proceeding criminally or civilly, and
provision should therefore be made for annulment actions on this ground
to be initiated by the state. Further, either party should be able to
petition for determination of the marriage status. The interest of society
in ending the relationship or in having the marital status clarified should
take precedence over any interest society may have in punishing the
parties. Also, the prior spouse should be given a statutory right to seek
a judicial determination of the status of the second marriage. A con-
tinuation of the second marriage may confuse the various property inter-
ests involved, and the prior spouse should be in a position to ascertain his
or her own status.
Once the disability of the prior marriage is removed by divorce or
the death of the previous spouse, the second marriage should be deemed
validated from the time the disability is removed if the parties continue
to live together as man and wife. This position is presumably followed in
61. See VITAL STATISTICS, note 22 supra.
62. Day v. Day, 216 S.C. 334, 58 S.E.2d 83 (1950).
63. FLA. STAT. 61.041(9) (1967).
64. FLA. STAT. 799.01 (1967).
65. Ellison v. State, 100 Fla. 736, 129 So. 887 (1930).
66. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1551(3) (1953); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 140(a)
(McKinney 1964) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 12 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. lit. 15, § 511 (1958);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.02(3) (1957).
67. Brown v. Brown, 186 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1966); Burger v. Burger, 166 So.2d 433
(Fla. 1964); H-iggins v. Higgins, 146 So.2d 122 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
68. See note 64 supra.
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Florida;69 at least it was followed prior to the nonrecognition of common
law marriages in this state." This acceptance of the second marriage as
being validated without a new ceremony will amount to a limited adop-
tion of the common law marriage in those states which do not recognize
common law marriages. Society will gain nothing by denying recognition of
the validity of the marriage if the parties continue living together as
man and wife.
Of 2,240 annulments granted in this state since 1959, 556 have
been on the ground of bigamy. With the exception of fraud, this ground
is used more than any other in the state of Florida.71
C. Impotency
Impotency is the inability to copulate.72 It is a ground for divorce in
some jurisdictions, 7 including Florida,74 but it is not a ground for
annulment in the absence of statute. 75 The majority of jurisdictions
which have such enactments deem these marriages voidable. 6
Annulment is the traditional remedy when one of the parties is
impotent at the time of the marriage, and many states so provide by
statute. 77 Some states require that the disability be permanent or incur-
able,78 a difficult prognosis to make with any definiteness. The law is
similar in Florida, but by case law. 79 This is not a realistic approach to
the problem; while the disability should be more than just temporary, it
should not be required to be permanent or incurable. Most of the legis-
lation dealing with impotency emphasizes a physical inability to perform
the sex act.8" There is also, in many cases, an incapacity to copulate
which is psychogenic.8 ' Whether the inability is physical or mental, the
result is the same: there is no sexual intercourse. Impotency as a ground
for annulment should not be confined to "physical" or "permanent," but
should also include mental or emotional difficulties which are likely to be
more than merely temporary. Either party should be permitted to bring
the action, subject to the defense of antenuptial knowledge.
69. Jones v. Jones, 119 Fla. 824, 161 So. 836 (1935).
70. FLA. STAT. § 741.211 (1967).
71. See VITAL STATISTICS, note 22 supra.
72. Helen v. Thomas, 52 Del. 1, 150 A.2d 833 (Super. Ct. 1959).
73. See note 3 supra.
74. FLA. STAT. § 61.041(2) (1967).
75. Linneman v. Linneman, 1 Ill. App. 2d 48, 116 N.E.2d 182 (1953).
76. See note 36 supra.
77. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-106 (1947); CAL. Crv. CODE § 82 (Deering 1960);
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANiN. § 46-3-1(h) (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1551(1) (1953);
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 324-1(e) (Supp. 1965).
78. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 82 (Deering 1960); Trx. REv. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 4628
(1960); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-1 (1966); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.02(1) (1957).
79. Cott v. Cott, 98 So.2d 379 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1957).
80. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-106 (1947); CAL. Civ. CODE § 82 (Deering 1960);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-3-1(h) (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1551(1) (1953).
81. "Psychogenic" means attributable to mental causes.
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Of 2,240 annulments granted in Florida since 1959, 81 have been on
the ground of impotency. In frequency of use, the ground of impotency
ranks near the middle.82
D. Mental Incompetency
Various phrases are used to describe the mental condition which is
sufficient to permit annulment. Lunacy,83 idiocy,84 feeblemindedness, 3
imbecility,86 insanity 7 and unsound mind88 are some of the terms used.
Some statutes refer to a mental incapacity to consent.89 Some require
that the condition exist at the time of marriage." The reason for the
annulment is the lack of ability to understand the nature and obligations
of the marriage relationship. In legal terms, it is the absence of legal
ability to consent."
Marriages of mental incompetents are voidable in most states.92 In
Florida a marriage with an idiot or a lunatic is void ab initio3 This
state also considers void those marriages contracted with people in a
"generally poor condition" 4 and people of advanced age 95- situations
where there is not necessarily any real mental incompetency.
The statutes of a few jurisdictions provide that marriages with
mental incompetents are voidable by either spouse,96 while those of
other states allow only the afflicted party or his guardian to bring the
action." The party suffering the disability or the competent party who
enters into the marriage without being aware of the other's incapacity
should be permitted to request annulment, even after consummation. If
82. See VITAL STATISTICS, note 22 supra.
83. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. it. 13, § 1551(5) (1953); Ky. REV. STAT. § 402.020
(1962).
84. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-104 (1965); Ky. RYv. STAT. § 402.020 (1962).
85. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 5 (1958); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 457.10 (1955).
86. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457.10 (1955); VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-46 (1960).
87. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1551(5) (1953); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 324-26
(1955).
88. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.090(2) (1962); DEs.. CoDE ANN. tit. 13, § 101(b) (1)
(1953).
89. See, e.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 55-106 (1947); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-3-1(g)
(1963).
90. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 82 (Deering 1960); IowA CODE ANN. § 598.19(4) (1946).
91. Mahan v. Mahan, 88 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1956), in which the parties were so intoxicated
at the time of the marriage that they were mentally incapable of forming the intent neces-
sary to enter into the contract.
92. See note 39 supra.
93. Kuehmsted v. Turnwall, 103 Fla. 1180, 138 So. 775 (1932).
94. Id.
95. Savage v. Olson, 151 Fla. 241, 9 So.2d 363 (1942).
96. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1551 (1953); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 140(c)
(McKinney 1964); Omao REV. CoDE ANN. §§ 3105.31, 3105.32 (Page Supp. 1968); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 247.02(5) (1957).
97. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-106 (1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. it. 12, § 1283 (1961);
VT. STAT. AsNN. tit. 15, § 514 (1958); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.04.130 (1961).
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the parties ratify the marriage by continued cohabitation after the com-
petent party becomes aware of the incapacity, or after the disabled party
recovers to the point of understanding the nature of the marriage con-
tract, then the action should not be allowed by either party.
Of the 2,240 annulments granted in this state in the past ten years,
24 have been based on the ground of "insanity." This ground ranks near
the bottom in frequency of use; only duress and incest are used less
of ten.98
E. Intoxication or Influence of Drugs
There may also be lack of consent where either of the parties was
intoxicated or under the influence of drugs to such an extent as to be
unaware of what was happening at the time of the marriage. These mar-
riages are voidable in many states because of lack of understanding.99
This is true in Florida as to intoxication, 0 but has not been extended
to marriages contracted while one of the parties was under the influence
of drugs. If the marriage is not consummated by later sexual intercourse,
it should be annullable on the initiative of either party because of the
desirability of ending the relationship as quickly as possible.
In the last ten years, only 40 annulments granted in this state have
been on the ground of intoxication at the time of the marriage. 101
F. Jest or Dare
The so-called "limited purpose" marriages are generally held not to
be annullable.10 2 "Limited purpose" marriages are marriages wherein the
parties marry for one specific and limited purpose, such as to give a child
a name or to circumvent the immigration laws, with no intention to con-
summate the marriage or to live as man and wife. The majority of courts
refuse to give effect to the intent of the parties, holding the marriages
valid. Parties who enter into these marriages for one specific purpose
should not be permitted to have the marriages invalidated, thus, in effect,
using the courts to further their own limited interests.
The exceptions to holding these limited purpose marriages valid
are those cases dealing with marriages entered into as a joke or on a
dare. These unions lack the requisite consent of the parties; neither party
seriously intends to enter into a permanent relationship. Colorado is the
only state making these marriages annullable by statute.0 8
98. See VITAL STATISTICS, note 22 supra.
99. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-106 (1947); N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 7(2) (McKinney
1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1283 (1961); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 26.04.130 (1961).
100. See note 91 supra. In the Mahan case, the marriage was never consummated, an
extremely important factor in Florida.
101. See VITAL STATISTICS, note 22 supra.
102. See, e.g., Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 196, 69 A.2d 831 (1949).
103. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-3-1(e) (1963).
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Annulment should be available on the petition of either party if both
parties entered the marriage as a jest or on a dare, or if one party so
entered the marriage and this fact was known or should have been known
to the other party, provided the parties do not thereafter live together as
husband and wife. Otherwise, because of the possibility of fraud or
collusion between the parties, the statute should not provide for annul-
ment of limited purpose marriages.
G. Incapacity Due to Nonage
The ages at which individuals are permitted to marry vary from
state to state. Most states require consent of the parents for marriages of
males under the age of 21 and females under the age of 18.1°4 These
marriages are generally treated as voidable," 5 and can be ratified by
continued cohabitation after attainment of the requisite age.' Most
states also prohibit marriages of males under 18 and females under 16,
even with the consent of their parents. 7 Florida establishes the age of
21 as the age of consent for both males and females,108 and also prohibits
the marriage of males under 18 and females under 16 but permits them
to marry, in the court's discretion, without the consent of their parents
or guardians upon their sworn application that they are the parents or
expectant parents of a child.0 9
The underage party or his parent or guardian should be allowed to
bring the action. Where the male party is under the age of 18 and the
female is under the age of 16, if the female is pregnant, they should
be permitted to marry in the discretion of the court. Where the male is
under 18 and the female is under 16, and no pregnancy is involved, the
parents are not permitted to consent to the marriage, and the state at-
torney should be given the authority to initiate the annulment proceedings.
If the parents consent before or after the marriage of a female 16
or older and a male 18 or older, no annulment should be granted. The
statute should provide for post-nuptial validation by parental consent,
which should be in writing and authenticated.
Since 1958 there have been 95 annulments granted for nonage in
Florida. This ground ranks somewhere in the middle in frequency of
use.
110
104. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 34, § 10 (1958); ALAsxcA STAT. § 25.05.171 (1962);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 123 (1953).
105. See note 41 supra.
106. See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 355 S.W.2d 383 (Mo. App. 1962).
107. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-102(a) (1956); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 123(a) (1953); OHio REV. CoDE ANN. § 3101.01 (Page 1960); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-48
(1960).
108. FLA. STAT. § 741.04 (1967).
109. FLA. STAT. § 741.06 (1967).
110. See VITAL STATISTICS, note 22 supra.
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H. Fraud
Fraud has as its basis the lack of consent of one of the parties. The
reasoning is that his or her consent has been induced by the fraud of the
other party and is therefore vitiated. This ground makes the marriage
voidable. The fraud may take the form of either a misrepresentation or
a failure to disclose and must generally go to the essentials of the
marriage. The statutes providing for annulment for fraud,"-' however, do
not enumerate elements which would satisfy the requirement that the
fraud go to the essentials of the marriage. In some states a lesser degree
of fraud is sufficient for annulment where the marriage has not been con-
summated." 2 In other states, including Florida,1 ' whether or not an
annulment will be granted at all is dependent on whether the marriage
has been consummated.11 4 Logically, consummation should not be rele-
vant; a party cannot act upon a fraud until he discovers it.
The fraud cases run the gamut as to the particular facts that will
constitute fraud sufficient to justify an annulment. No annulment will be
granted, however, where the fraud goes only to personal qualities or
attributes-a party's character, fortune, health, or temper." 5
If a woman falsely represents to a man with whom she has had
sexual relations that she is pregnant, and the man marries her in reliance
on this misrepresentation, some jurisdictions will grant an annulment," 6
but the majority will not." 7 Most of the cases denying annulments sought
on the ground of a fraudulent claim of pregnancy have done so because
of 1) the in pari delicto doctrine,"' 2) the plaintiff's obligation, 3) a
finding that the fraud did not go to the essence of the marriage, or 4)
public policy.
Denial of annulment should not be allowed in order to punish the
parties. In these situations, annulment is refused in order to punish a man
who, by marrying the woman in reliance on her misrepresentation, has
111. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-106 (1947); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-3-1(c)
(1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.02 (1969); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-118 (1968); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 106.030 (1967).
112. See, e.g., Damaskinos v. Damaskinos, 325 Mass. 217, 89 N.E.2d 766 (1950);
Houlahan v. Horzepa, 46 N.J. Super. 583, 135 A.2d 232 (1957); Brillis v. Brillis, 4 N.Y.2d
125, 149 N.E.2d 510, 173 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1958).
113. Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 46 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1950).
114. See, e.g., Hyslop v. Hyslop, 241 Ala. 223, 2 So.2d 443 (1941).
115. See, e.g., Arndt v. Arndt, 336 fI1. App. 65, 82 N.E.2d 908 (1948).
116. See, e.g., Parks v. Parks, 418 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1967); Masters v. Masters, 13
Wis. 2d 332, 108 N.W.2d 674 (1961).
117. See, e.g., Mobley v. Mobley, 245 Ala. 90, 16 So.2d 5 (1943); Mason v. Mason,
164 Ark. 59, 261 S.W. 40 (1924); Gondouin v. Gondouin, 14 Cal. App. 285, 111 P. 756
(1910); Brandt v. Brandt, 123 Fla. 680, 167 So. 524 (1936); Whitehouse v. Whitehouse,
129 Me. 24, 149 A. 572 (1930); Levy v. Levy, 309 Mass. 230, 34 N.E.2d 650 (1941);
Diamond v. Diamond, 101 N.H. 338, 143 A.2d 109 (1958).
118. In pari delicto refers to the equal guilt of both parties. The plaintiff, by engaging
in premarital sexual relations with the defendant and thus having prior knowledge of the
defendant's unchastity, should also have known that she was capable of deceiving him.
Westfall v. Westfall, 100 Ore. 224, 197 P. 271 (1921).
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sought to do the "right thing." In thus penalizing the man, the courts are
approving and encouraging the fraudulent conduct of the woman. There is
no valid reason why the woman, who has voluntarily entered into sexual
relations with the man, should be given such preferential treatment,
particularly in this day of "liberated" morality. If either party is to be
favored, it should be the man, the less guilty of the two. He has at
least, although somewhat tardily, acted commendably in marrying the
woman; she has not only been as guilty initially as the man, but addition-
ally has perpetrated a fraud in order to induce him to marry her.
Where the woman is actually pregnant by another man, and has
misrepresented that the spouse is the father, thereby inducing his mar-
riage to her, the results have varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The
husband must have been unaware of the facts at the time of the marriage
if an annulment is to be granted. Most courts will allow the annulment
if the husband can prove that the woman is pregnant by someone else,
which would seem to be the better view.
Another area of fraud is that dealing with a fraudulent promise by
one party to embrace the religious faith of the other party.
A party who consents to enter marriage on condition that the
civil ceremony will be followed by a religious ceremony may
have a cause of action for annulment if after the civil ceremony
the other party refuses to perform the religious ceremony. The
person seeking annulment must establish that the promise re-
specting the religious ceremony was a vital element inducing
consent to the civil marriage." 9
Another important area of fraud is that dealing with the refusal of
one party to have uncontracepted intercourse with the other party.
Nowhere in the United States is willful refusal to consummate the mar-
riage an express ground for annulment or divorce, nor is refusal to have
uncontracepted intercourse. Nevertheless, such refusal may enable the
other spouse to obtain an annulment for fraud.' A number of cases have
held that the requisite fraud exists where one party expressly and falsely
promises before marriage to have children afterward. 121 Some courts have
even granted annulments for fraud on an implied promise to have chil-
dren after marriage. 22
The alleged grounds for fraud appear to be diverse and inexhaust-
ible. Annulments have been granted for inducing a woman to marry on
a false pledge of love when the man entered the marriage solely to ob-
119. Comment, Annulment of Marriage in New York for Fraud Based Upon Religious
Factors, 30 Foe oAm L. REv. 776, 780 (1962). It occurs to the writer that if religious unity
were such a vital element, the party seeking an annulment on this ground might have insisted
that conversion to his or her faith be effectuated prior to the marriage.
120. Bernstein v. Bernstein, 25 Conn. Supp. 239, 201 A.2d 660 (Super. Ct. 1964).
121. See, e.g., Stegienko v. Stegienko, 295 Mich. 530, 295 N.W. 252 (1940).
122. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Buccino, 22 N.J. Super. 114, 91 A.2d 629 (1952).
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tain preferential immigration treatment,128 a woman's failure to disclose
that she never intended to adopt her husband's name or live with him,124
and a man's marrying a woman to defraud her of her property. 25
Whether or not an annulment will be granted for fraud must necessarily
depend on the particular circumstances of each case.
Mention should be made of fraud perpetrated by a third party. The
parents of one of the parties could make false representations of which
neither party to the marriage is aware. Although this case would
probably be relatively rare as compared to fraud practiced by a party to
the marriage, the result would be the same-lack of real consent. An
annulment should be available in such a case.
The innocent party who was induced to enter into the marriage
contract by the fraud of the other party should be permitted to bring
the action. If both parties to the marriage were induced because of the
fraud of a third party, either one should be allowed to initiate the pro-
ceedings. Because of the uncertainty concerning the specifics of annul-
ment on the basis of -fraud, it will be necessary for the courts to deal
with each case individually.
Of the 2,240 annulments in Florida since 1958, 669 were granted
on the ground of fraud. Fraud is used the highest number of times as a
ground for annulment.126
I. Duress
Duress is another ground based on lack of consent. It involves no
real consent because one of the parties has induced the other to marry
by the use of threats or exercising physical force on the other party or
his family. Duress makes the marriage voidable. Most of the cases in-
volve a man's entering into the marriage in order to avoid prosecution for
bastardy, seduction, or rape; the man has the choice of marrying the
girl or going to jail. It is generally held that a marriage entered into in
order to avoid the consequences of threatened prosecution may not be
annulled.' 27
About half the states have enactments expressly providing for the
nullification of marriages contracted under duress,2 8 but most of the re-
maining states have adopted the view that courts of equity have inherent
jurisdiction to annul such unions. 29 Most legislation merely refers to
123. Babis v. Babis, 45 Del. 496, 75 A.2d 580 (Super. Ct. 1950).
124. Handley v. Handley, 179 Cal. App. 2d 742, 3 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1960).
125. See, e.g., Sampson v. Sampson, 332 Mich. 214, 50 N.W.2d 764 (1952).
126. See VITAL STATISTICS, note 22 supra.
127. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 314 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
128. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.031 (1962); CAL. CIV. CODE § 82 (Deering 1960);
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-3-1(d) (1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.02 (1969); N.Y. Dom.
REL. LAW § 7(4) (McKinney 1964); WASr. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.04.130 (1961); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 20-33 (1957).
129. See, e.g., Worthington v. Worthington, 234 Ark. 216, 352 S.W.2d 80 (1962).
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marriage induced by force, without making any attempt to define the
kind or amount of force required.3 ° Duress as a ground for annulment
should be limited to physical force or very serious threats thereof. As
stated, the most common allegation of duress is that involving threatened
legal action growing out of premarital sexual relations where the party
has a "free" choice.
Physical force applied by a third party, such as the father of the
bride at a "shotgun" wedding, should also permit annulment. The source
of the pressure should make no difference; there is still a lack of consent.
The majority of American jurisdictions permit an innocent party
who has married under duress to have the union annulled.'' In Florida
twelve annulments were granted on the ground of duress over the past
ten years. Except for incest, this ground is used less than any other.8 2
VI. DEFENSES
Under the prevailing view, a plaintiff can obtain an annulment of a
void marriage even though he entered the union with awareness of the
impediment and even though his conduct may have been censurable in
other respects. 33 The cases involving incest follow this principle, but
the degrees within which marriage is forbidden vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Generally, a marriage contracted locally between parties who
are within the prohibited degrees is annullable regardless of the plaintiff's
premarital knowledge of the impediment. However, if such a union was
formed out of the state, it is valid locally if legal where celebrated.13
Bigamous marriages are also generally held annullable whether or
not the plaintiff knew of the prior existing marriage, 3 ' although there is
a minority view to the contrary." 6 A few decisions take the position that
even though a bigamous marriage is absolutely void, one who knowingly
enters into such a relationship should be estopped from obtaining an
annulment decree. 3 7 This view has been followed in Florida.88
Estoppel is employed as a defense to attacks on defective marriages
130. See, e.g., CAL. Cir. CODE § 82 (Deering 1960); CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-3-1(d)
(1963); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 580-21(6) (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.02 (1947);
N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 7(4) (McKinney 1964); WYo. STAT."ANN. § 20-33 (1957).
131. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.02 (1947); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 7(4)
(McKinney 1964).
132. See VITAL STATISTICS, note 22 supra.
133. See, e.g., Seacord v. Seacord, 33 Del. 485, 139 A. 80 (Super. Ct. 1927); Reed v.
Reed, 202 Ga. 508, 43 S.E.2d 539 (1947); Townsend v. Morgan, 192 Md. 168, 63 A.2d
743 (1949); Smith v. Smith, 72 Ohio App. 203, 50 N.E.2d 889 (1943); Kiessenbeck v.
Kiessenbeck, 145 Ore. 82, 26 P.2d 58 (1933).
134. Moore, Defenses Available in Annuilment Actions, 7 J. FAxMxY L. 239 (1967).
135. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 245 Ala. 145, 16 So.2d 401 (1944).
136. Rediker v. Rediker 35 Cal. 2d 796, 221 P.2d 1 (1950); Otte v. Pierce, 118 Colo.
123, 194 P.2d 331 (1948).
137. See, e.g., Keys v. Keys, 22 N.H. 553 (1851) (dictum); Storf v. Papalia, 24 N.J.
Misc. 145, 46 A.2d 907 (Ch. 1946) (dictum).
138. Higgins v. Higgins, 146 So.2d 122 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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and invalid divorces. In those states which have interlocutory divorce
decrees,3 9 if one of the parties gets married within the interlocutory
period, the marriage is generally held void. 4 ' However, at least five states
hold that a divorced person's remarriage within the restricted period is
merely voidable. 4 ' If the party under the interlocutory restriction mar-
ries someone else who has knowledge of the restriction, the person having
such knowledge is estopped from attacking its validity, even in those
states where the marriage is absolutely void.'42 Further, if the person
with knowledge of the restriction participates with the party under the
restriction in obtaining an invalid divorce,'43 the doctrine of estoppel is
also invoked. Thus, even though his marriage to the person who obtained
the invalid divorce is void, he is estopped from attacking it because of
his participation.
Antenuptial knowledge is a defense to annulment actions brought on
the ground of impotency. If the plaintiff knew of the impotency of the
other spouse before or at the time of the marriage, or had knowledge of
facts sufficient to put him on notice, annulment will be denied.' Dela-
ware,145 New Jersey,1 40 West Virginia'47 and Wisconsin 4 ' so provide in
their annulment acts.
Marriages of mental incompetents, where voidable, can be ratified by
continued cohabitation of the parties after the competent party becomes
aware of the incapacity, or after the disabled spouse's faculties have been
restored. 49 If the capable partner is aware of the other spouse's dis-
ability at the time of the marriage, the annulment should not be granted
on his petition.
Marriages entered into while either party was intoxicated or under
the influence of drugs can be ratified by cohabitation after the effect of
the drinks or drugs wears off.' 50
Marriages made in jest or on a dare can be ratified by cohabita-
tion.' 5'
If underage parties continue to cohabit or otherwise confirm the
139. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 34, §§ 23, 38 (1958); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.17 (1946);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. it. 12, § 1280 (1961); TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4640 (1960) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-118, 20-119 (1953).
140. See, e.g., Scuchart v. Scuchart, 61 Kan. 597, 60 P. 311 (1900).
141. Park v. Barron, 20 Ga. 702 (1856); State v. Yoder, 113 Minn. 503, 130 N.W. 10
(1911); Crawford v. State, 73 Miss. 172, 18 So. 848 (1895); Woodward v. Blake, 38 N.D.
38, 164 N.W. 156 (1917); Gress v. Gress, 209 S.W.2d 1003 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
142. See, e.g., Mallon v. Mallon, 87 Pa. Super. 42 (1925).
143. For example, a divorce obtained in a state not having jurisdiction over the subject
matter is invalid.
144. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 74 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
145. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1551 (1953).
146. N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-1 (1952).
147. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-1 (1966).
148. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.02(1) (1957).
149. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Minn. 124, 46 N.W. 323 (1890).
150. See, e.g., Prine v. Prine, 36 Fla. 676, 18 So. 781 (1895).
151. See, e.g., Brooks-Bischoffberger v. Bischoffberger, 129 Me. 52, 149 A. 606 (1930).
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marriage after attaining majority, they have ratified the marriage and
forfeited their right to annulment. 15 2 Many states so provide by statute. 5 '
In cases involving fraud, a plaintiff may be denied relief even though
he can prove that the defendant deceived him with regard to a matter
material to their marriage, if the plaintiff had enough information to put
him on notice of the fraud, or if his own premarital conduct was in pari
delicto. Also, in most United States jurisdictions, one who by words or
conduct ratifies or affirms a fraudulent marriage after discovery of the
fraud forfeits his right to have the union annulled."'
Ratification is operative as a defense to marriages contracted under
duress if the parties continue to cohabit after the coercion has been re-
moved. 15 5 Additionally, a person who has valid grounds for an annulment,
but who delays bringing suit, may find himself barred from relief. Several
states have statutes of limitation concerning annulment actions.58
In order to clarify the law, it would be advisable to include certain
of the foregoing defenses in statutes providing for annulment. The time
in which the annulment suit may be brought should be specifically pro-
vided according to the ground under which the proceedings are initiated.
VII. JURISDICTION
Many states statutorily provide certain courts with the power to
hear annulment suits. In those states that have no statutes, including
Florida, the courts inherently have the power.' 57
By analogy to divorce, the great weight of authority holds that the
courts of the parties' domicile have jurisdiction to annul a marriage
celebrated elsewhere.' 58 The general view is that the domicile of only
one of the parties within the state is sufficient to confer jurisdiction to
grant annulment,'59 provided that there is proper service upon the non-
resident defendant.160 The main reason for adopting the state of domicile
152. See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 355 S.W.2d 383 (Mo. App. 1962).
153. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 82 (Deering 1960); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 16-403
(1966); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-501(1) (1963); MICE. ComP. LAWS ANN. §§ 552.2, 552.34
(1948); NEB. REV. STAT, § 42-118 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-1 (1952); N.Y. Dom.
REL. LAW § 140(b) (McKinney 1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 513 (1958).
154. See A. JACOBS & J. GOEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 312
(4th ed. 1961).
155. Sherman v. Sherman, 174 Iowa 145, 156 N.W. 301 (1916); Merrell v. Moore, 47
Tex. Civ. App. 200, 104 S.W. 514 (1907).
156. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-502 (1963); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 48-203
(1961); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.32 (Page Supp. 1968); S.D. ComP. LAWS ANN.
§ 14.0602 (1967); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-46 (1957).
157. See 1 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 31.02 (2d ed. 1961).
158. See, e.g., Hamlet v. Hamlet, 242 Ala. 70, 4 S.2d 901 (1941); Romatz v. Romatz,
355 Mich. 81, 94 N.W.2d 432 (1959); Foster v. Nordman, 244 S.C. 485, 137 S.E.2d 600
(1964); Everly v. Baumil, 209 S.C. 287, 39 S.E.2d 905 (1946).
159. See, e.g., Aiello v. Aiello, 272 Ala. 505, 133 So.2d 18 (1961) ; Perlstein v. Perlstein,
152 Conn. 152, 204 A.2d 909 (1964); Damaskinos v. Damaskinos, 325 Mass. 217, 89 N.E.2d
766 (1950).
160. See, e.g., Bing Gee v. Chan Lai Yung Gee, 89 Cal. App. 2d 877, 202 P.2d 360
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as the jurisdictional basis for annulment is the interest that the state has
in the marital status of its citizens. Since a party may be a domiciliary of
a state in which he does not reside, it would be preferable to base juris-
diction upon residence instead of domicile.
In addition, courts of the state where the marriage was celebrated
are generally considered to have annulment jurisdiction.' Some cases
hold that the state of celebration has jurisdiction to annul a marriage
even though neither party is a resident." 2 The contrary view, to the effect
that the state where the marriage was celebrated has no jurisdiction to
annul where neither party is domiciled within that state, was derived
from the decision of Williams v. North Carolina.68
In annulment, courts generally apply the law of the state in which
the marriage was contracted, 64 subject to the ultimate power of the
domicile to apply its own law. 165
Absent an express provision, it is commonly held that divorce
residency requirements do not control, and that domicile within the
jurisdiction need not have continued for any particular period in order
to permit a suit for annulment. 6
VIII. SERVICE OF PROCESS
In the absence of statute, the cases disagree as to the type of service
required for annulment. Most courts hold that personal service within
the state is necessary,'67 although the Florida Statutes expressly provide
for constructive service.' A minority position holds that the service
requirements for annulment should be the same as those for divorce. 16 9
The issue has been somewhat clouded by the in rem-in personam
distinction. Substituted or constructive service of process is allowed in
connection with actions in rem. In these proceedings, a res which is at
the domicile is required. The marital status is the res in divorce, but in
an annulment action the contention is that there was never any marriage;
(1949); Rinaldi v. Rinaldi, 94 N.J. Eq. 14, 118 A. 685 (1922); Winter v. Winter, 256 N.Y.
113, 175 N.E. 533 (1931) ; Piper v. Piper, 46 Wash. 671, 91 P. 189 (1907).
161. See, e.g., Bramble v. Kemper, 227 Ark. 186, 297 S.W.2d 104 (1957); Feigenbaum
v. Feigenbaum, 210 Ark. 186, 194 S.W.2d 1012 (1946); Sawyer v. Slack, 196 N.C. 697, 146
S.E. 864 (1929).
162. See, e.g., Jordan v. Courtney, 248 Ala. 390, 27 So.2d 783 (1946); Bramble v.
Kemper, 227 Ark. 186, 297 S.W.2d 104 (1957); Feigenbaum v. Feigenbaum, 210 Ark. 186,
194 S.W.2d 1012 (1946); Titus v. Titus, 115 W. Va. 229, 174 S.E. 874 (1934).
163. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
164. RESTATEMENT OF THE CoNFLicT or LAWS §§ 115, 121 (1934); see also Storke,
Annulment in the Conflict of Laws, 43 MINiT. L. REV. 849 (1959).
165. RESTATEMENT OF THE CONPLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1934); see also Storke, Annulment
in the Conflict of Laws, 43 MiNN. L. REv. 849 (1959).
166. See, e.g., Foster v. Foster, 89 N.H. 376, 199 A. 367 (1938).
167. See, e.g., Gayle v. Gayle, 301 Ky. 613, 192 S.W.2d 821 (1946).
168. See note 20 supra.
169. See, e.g., Perlstein v. Perlstein, 152 Conn. 152, 204 A.2d 909 (1964); Winter v.
Winter, 256 N.Y. 113, 175 N.E. 533 (1931).
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therefore there would be no res. Actions in personam require personal
service within the state where the action is brought. The majority of
states having no statutes on constructive service hold that the action
must be in personam. 170 It is necessary to look to each jurisdiction in
order to determine whether the action is classified as in personam or in
rem.
A requirement of personal service would best insure that the de-
fendant would have notice of the suit. However, if it is impossible for
the plaintiff to effect personal service, he will be precluded from obtaining
an annulment. Further, if the defendant is not living in his state of
domicile, in the plaintiff's state of domicile, or in the state where the
marriage was celebrated, he cannot be personally served in any state
having subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, statutory provisions for
constructive service of process should be included as a part of the general
annulment statute.
The in rem-in personam distinction is a workable theory where real
estate is concerned, the res being the land involved. However, in divorce
and annulment suits, the res is elusive, at best, and the distinction should
be avoided.
IX. CONSEQUENCES
A. Custody, Support, and Legitimacy of Children
Many states have passed statutes making children of annulled mar-
riages legitimate. 7' Others have distinguished between marriages that
are void ab initio and those that are voidable, holding the offspring of
only the latter to be legitimate.'72 Georgia 173 and North Carolina 174 have
statutes that prohibit annulment when children are born or will be born
of the marriage. In New Jersey a similar statute has been held to grant
the courts discretion to deny annulment if it would be adverse to the
child's best interests. 75 In the absence of statutory authorization, a
number of courts have assumed the right to grant custody and support
decrees on the basis of their inherent equity powers.17 Florida's courts
170. See, e.g., Cummington v. Belchertown, 149 Mass. 223, 21 N.E. 435 (1889).
171. See, e.g., COLO. PEV. STAT. ANN. § 46-3-5 (1963); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 46-28
(Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-124 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 27 (1957);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 48-207 (Supp. 1969); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458.23 (1955);
N.Y. Do . REL. LAW § 175 (McKinney 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169 (1967); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-832 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-7 (1968).
172. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. §§ 16-907, 16-908 (1966); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 391.100 (1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2748-03 (Supp. 1968); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-68 to
20-70 (1957).
173. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-601 (1961).
174. N.C. Gae. STAT. § 51-3 (1966).
175. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-1(g) (1952).
176. See, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 221 Ga. 510, 145 S.E.2d 546 (1965); Cardenas v.
Cardenas, 12 Ill. App. 2d 497, 140 N.E.2d 377 (1956); Clayton v. Clayton 231 Md. 74,
188 A.2d 550 (1963); Sanders v. Sanders, 232 S.C. 625, 103 S.E.2d 281 (1958); Home of
the Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1965).
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so hold.'77 Even in the absence of a statute, it is generally accepted that
the father of an illegitimate child owes him a duty of support.' As
discussed supra, there is no justification for imposing the burden of
illegitimacy on children of annulled marriages. Statutory provision should
specifically be made for the purpose of legitimatizing all such children.
Further, the court should have the power to determine custody and order
support similar to its power in divorce proceedings.
B. Alimony
Absent express statutory provision, courts in a majority of states
award temporary alimony and court costs when the wife enters a good
faith defense to an annulment suit by the husband. 9 In Florida, a wife
who defends such a suit may be awarded temporary alimony and suit
money when necessary in the court's discretion. 8' Relief should be
granted according to the wife's need and the husband's ability to pay.
If the wife fails to assert the validity of the marriage, her request for
temporary relief will be denied on the ground that no right to alimony
arises in the absence of a valid marriage. 8' If there are children, several
courts have awarded temporary alimony for the express purpose of main-
taining the children during the pendency of the action.8 2 This procedure
has been followed in Florida. 3 A number of states have statutes that
expressly permit the court to award temporary alimony and litigation
fees in these proceedings. 84 The best solution would be to authorize tem-
porary allowances in annulment suits where the woman has in good faith
entered into the marriage. She has a right to such allowances, and neither
the theoretical existence of a valid marriage nor her position as plaintiff
or defendant should affect this right.
In the absence of an express statutory provision, most courts have
not allowed permanent alimony following an annulment.'85 The courts
177. Todd v. Todd, 151 Fla. 134, 9 So.2d 279 (1942).
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Peacock v. Peacock, 264 Ala. 332, 87 So.2d 626 (1956); Middlecoff v.
Middlecoff, 171 Cal. App. 2d 286, 340 P.2d 331 (1959); DuPont v. DuPont, 46 Del. 592,
87 A.2d 394 (1952); Franklin v. Franklin, 365 Mo. 442, 283 S.W.2d 483 (1955) ; Fowler
v. Fowler, 97 N.H. 216, 84 A.2d 836 (1951).
180. Prine v. Prine, 36 Fla. 676, 18 So. 781 (1895).
181. See, e.g., Peacock v. Peacock, 264 Ala. 332, 87 So.2d 626 (1956); Middlecoff v.
Middlecoff, 171 Cal. App. 2d 286, 340 P.2d 331 (1959); Pry v. Pry, 225 Ind. 458, 75
N.E.2d 909 (1947); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 239, 153 P.2d 262 (1944).
182. See, e.g., Taylor v. White, 160 N.C. 38, 75 S.E. 941 (1912).
183. See note 177 supra.
184. See, e.g., D.C. CoDE ENCYCL. ANN. § 16-911 (Supp. I, 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-1607 (1964); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1969); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 107.090 (1967); WASH. REV. CoD ANN. § 26.08.090 (1961).
185. See, e.g., Peacock v. Peacock, 264 Ala. 332, 87 So.2d 626 (1956); Middlecoff v.
Middlecoff, 171 Cal. App. 2d 286, 340 P.2d 331 (1959); DuPont v. DuPont, 46 Del. 592, 87
A.2d 394 (1952); Sclamberg v. Sclamberg, 220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 801 (1942); Short v.
Short, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 49, 102 N.E.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1951).
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of Florida have so held.8 6 The reasoning behind these decisions is that
since an annulment decree finds that no valid marriage ever existed, the
alleged husband owes no duty of maintenance or support to his "spouse."
Several states have enacted statutes expressly giving courts discretion
to award permanent alimony in annulment suits when such an allowance
would be just and equitable. 18 7 In Florida, if the annulment is granted
and the court determines that the wife is an innocent victim of the
husband's wrong, the supreme court has indicated that permanent ali-
mony and attorneys fees may be allowed on equitable principles.' 8
Awards of permanent alimony may be dictated in extreme circumstances,
such as where, by reason of living together as man and wife, the wife's
ability to maintain herself has been reduced. However, where the
marriage has been of short duration, it is difficult to justify imposing
upon the husband the burden of supporting a nonwife, no matter how
needy she may be.
The relation-back doctrine comes into play in a consideration of
alimony awards. In the state of Florida, payment of alimony by a man
to his first wife may be reinstated after the first wife's second marriage
has been annulled if the second marriage was void,8 9 but not if it was
voidable. 9° Thus, if her second marriage was to a man already married,
an innocent wife could sue for divorce and obtain alimony from her
second husband; or she could bring a suit for annulment and petition
the court for reinstatement of alimony by her first husband on the
ground that the second marriage was void. The wife should not have this
opportunity of choosing which husband she is going to sue, depending
on which one has the money. A Colorado statute provides that an ex-
wife's subsequent marriage, whether void or voidable, relieves a husband
from further payment of alimony.' 9' This would appear to be the better
position and should be adopted by statute in this state.
C. Property Rights
In theory, an annulment decree places the parties in the same posi-
tion as if the marriage had never existed. A majority of courts, however,
will effect some equitable distribution of the property accumulated dur-
ing the marriage.'92 Some courts treat the property as held in joint
186. Titcomb v. Titcomb, 160 Fla. 320, 34 So.2d 742 (1948); Therry v. Therry, 117
Fla. 453, 158 So. 120 (1934).
187. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 46-28 (Supp. 1969); IoWA CODE ANN. § 598-24
(1946); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 458.19 (1968); N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney
Supp. 1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.08.110 (1961).
188. See note 48 supra.
189. See note 49 supra.
190. See note 50 supra.
191. See note 51 supra.
192. See, e.g., Middlecoff v. Middlecoff, 171 Cal. App. 2d 286, 340 P.2d 331 (1959);
Arthur v. Arthur, 152 Cal. App. 2d 87, 312 P.2d 762 (1957) ; Rickards v. Rickards, 53 Del.
134, 166 A.2d 425 (1960) ; Lawrence v. Heavner, 232 N.C. 557, 61 S.E.2d 697 (1950).
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tenancy or tenancy in common, and order an equal division. 9' A sub-
stantial number of states have statutes specifically authorizing property
division in annulment suits. Several provide for division of property in
conjunction with the granting of alimony.'94 Although courts achieve
generally satisfactory results in dividing property upon annulment, it
would seem best, in the interests of clarity and simplicity, to provide a
statute expressly granting the courts discretion to distribute both jointly
and separately acquired property between the parties. Factors to be
considered would be the duration of the marriage, by whom the property
in question was acquired, who paid for it, the type of property involved,
and the relative financial positions of the parties. This solution would
promote consistency and fairness."
X. CONCLUSION
The marriage relationship, as one of the foundations of our society,
must be strong and durable. It should not be forced on the parties, nor,
on the other hand, should it be dissolved indiscriminately. An examina-
tion of the annulment cases reveals an apparent obsession to place guilt
in these situations; but annulment is not penal in nature, and should not
be granted or denied parties as a punitive measure.
There is a definite need for annulment legislation in Florida, to fill
the gaps in our law and to provide more effective relief than is now
available. Annulment should exist as a complete and separate remedy,
and not merely as an atrophied arm of divorce.
A PROPOSED STATUTE
Section 1. Incestuous Marriages.
Any marriage between parents and children, including grandparents
and grandchildren of every degree, brothers and sisters of the half as
well as of the whole blood, uncles and nieces, and aunts and nephews,
whether the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate, is annullable in an
action brought by either party to the marriage or by the state attorney
of the county where either party resides.
Section 2. Bigamous Marriages.
Any marriage between parties, either of whom at the time of the
marriage is lawfully married to another living person, is annullable in
an action brought by either party to the marriage, or by the lawful
spouse of either party, or by the state attorney of the county where
either party resides.
193. See, e.g., Donnelly v. Donnelly, 198 Md. 341, 84 A.2d 89 (1951); Lawrence v.
Heavner, 232 N.C. 557, 61 S.E.2d 697 (1950).
194. See, e.g., N.H. Ry. STAT. Am. § 458.19 (1968); ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.100 (1967);
WASH. REv. CODE AwN. § 26.08.110 (1961).
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A bigamous marriage shall not be annulled if the parties thereto live
together as husband and wife after the prior lawful marriage giving rise
to the bigamy has been dissolved, either by the death of the lawful spouse
or by divorce.
Section 3. Impotency.
A marriage between parties, either of whom at the time of the mar-
riage, for physical or mental reasons, was incapable of performing the
sex act incident to the marriage relationship, is annullable in an action
brought by either party to the marriage, provided that such incapacity
persists to the time of the action and seems likely to persist for more
than three years. Such a marriage shall not be annullable by the capable
party if said party knew of the incapacity of the other party at the time
of the marriage.
An action to annul a marriage on the ground of impotency must be
brought within three years of the marriage.
Section 4. Mental Incompetency
A marriage is annullable if, at the time of the marriage, either of the
parties was mentally incapable of understanding the nature of the mar-
riage contract. The action may be brought by either party or the guardian
of the incapacitated party, provided that the parties do not live together
as husband and wife during a period when both are mentally capable of
understanding the nature of the marriage contract. Such a marriage shall
not be annullable by the competent party if said party was, at the time
of the marriage, aware of the other's incapacity, or if the parties con-
tinue to live together as husband and wife after the competent party
becomes aware of the incapacity.
An action to annul a marriage on the ground of mental incompetency
must be brought within three years of the marriage by the incapacitated
party, or within one year of the marriage by the party not incapacitated.
Section 5. Intoxication or Influence of Drugs.
A marriage is annullable if either of the parties was so intoxicated,
or so under the influence of drugs, as to be unaware of the nature of the
ceremony performed, provided that the parties do not live together as
husband and wife after the incapacity induced by intoxication or drugs
has ceased. The action may be brought by either party.
An action to annul a marriage on grounds described in this section
must be brought within six months of the marriage.
Section 6. Jest or Dare.
A marriage is annullable if both parties entered the marriage as a
jest or on a dare, or if one party entered the marriage as a jest or on a
dare and this fact was known or should have been known to the other
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party, provided the parties do not after the marriage live together as
husband and wife. The action may be brought by either party.
An action to annul a marriage on the ground that it was entered
into as a jest or on a dare must be brought within six months of the
marriage.
Section 7. Incapacity Due to Age.
A marriage is annullable if at the time of the marriage either party
was under the age of 21 years. If the male party is over the age of 18
years and the female party is over the age of 16 years, consent to the
marriage may be given by a. parent, guardian or person in charge of the
underage party, in which event no annulment will be granted. The con-
sent must be evidenced by a written document authenticated by a notary
public or other competent authority, and may be given either before or
after the marriage. The action may be brought by the underage party. A
marriage described as annullable in this section shall not be annulled if
the parties live together as husband and wife after the underage party
reaches the age of consent.
If the male party is under the age of 18 years or the female party
is under the age of 16 years, unless the county judge has issued the
marriage license pursuant to Chapter 741.06, the marriage is annullable
whether or not a parent, guardian or person in charge of such underage
party consents thereto, and the action may be brought by the underage
party, a parent, guardian or person in charge of the underage party, or
the state attorney of the county where the underage party resides.
Section 8. Fraud.
A marriage is annullable in an action broughtby:
1. A party who enters the marriage in reliance on a fraudulent act,
misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact by the other party,
provided that the fraud goes to the essence of the marriage.
2. A party who enters the marriage in reliance on a fraudulent act
or misrepresentation made by a third person, whether or not the other
party to the marriage was aware of the fraudulent act or misrepresenta-
tion, provided that the fraud goes to the essence of the marriage.
3. Either party, where both parties enter the marriage in reliance
on a fraudulent act or misrepresentation made by a third person, pro-
vided the fraud goes to the essence of the marriage.
A marriage shall not be annulled on the ground of fraud if the com-
plaining party was aware of the fraud at the time of the marriage or if
the parties continue to live together as husband and wife after discovery
of the fraud by the complaining party.
An action to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud must be
brought within one year after discovery of the fraud, and in no case
later than ten years.
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Section 9. Duress.
A marriage is annullable in an action brought by the party who
enters the marriage as the result of physical duress exercised by the other
party, or by a third person whether or not the other party knew of the
exercise of duress, or in an action brought by either party if both parties
enter the marriage as the result of physical duress exercised by a third
person.
No annulment on the ground of duress shall be granted if the parties
continue to live together as husband and wife after the duress is re-
moved.
An action to annul under this section must be brought within one
year of the marriage.
Section 10. Jurisdiction.
The circuit courts of this state have jurisdiction of all actions for
annulment of marriages.
To obtain an annulment, plaintiff need not reside in this state for
any specific period of time before filing the action.
An action for annulment may be instituted if the marriage was con-
tracted in this state, if either party to the marriage is domiciled in this
state at the time the action is commenced, or if either party is a resident
of this state at the time the action is commenced.
Section 11. Service of Process.
Service of process in actions for annulment of marriage may be
served by publication or personal service on the defendant outside of the
state.
Section 12. Legitimacy of Children.
All children born or to be born of annullable marriages shall be
deemed legitimate for all purposes.
Section 13. Custody, Support, Alimony, Property, Fees and Costs.
At all times after the filing of an annulment action, the circuit court
may issue such orders as the circumstances of the case may warrant for
the care, custody, and support of the children who are dependent upon
the parent or parents for support, and for suit money, court costs, and
attorney's fees.
When a decree of annulment has been entered, the court may make
such orders as the circumstances of the case may warrant relative to:
1. Care, custody and support of children who are dependent upon
the parent or parents for support.
2. Alimony for an innocent female party who is dependent upon the
other party for maintenance.
3. Division of property acquired during the marriage, other than
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by gift to or inheritance by either party individually, in such proportions
as may be fair and equitable.
4. Suit money, court costs, and attorney's fees.
5. Any other matters in controversy between the parties relevant to
the annulment of the marriage.
The court shall have the power to require security to be given to
insure enforcement of any such order.
The remarriage of a party entitled to alimony shall relieve the other
party from further payments of said alimony.
The court shall retain jurisdiction of the action for the purpose of
such later revisions of its orders as the circumstances may require.
Section 14. Repeal of Laws in Conflict.
All laws inconsistent with any provisions of this Act are hereby de-
clared void and of no further force or effect.
Section 15. Severability Provision.
If any section, sentence, clause, phrase or word of this Act is for
any reason held or declared to be unconstitutional, inoperative, or void,
such holding of invalidity shall not affect the remaining portions of this
Act; and it shall be construed to have been the intention of the Legisla-
ture to pass this Act without such unconstitutional, invalid, or inopera-
tive part therein, and the remaining portions of this Act, after the ex-
clusion of such part or parts, shall be deemed and held to be valid as if
such excluded part or parts had not been included therein.
